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Abstract 
Attitudes toward four types of decision making strategies (clinical/fully-rational, 
clinical/heuristic, actuarial/fully-rational, and actuarial/heuristic) were examined. Participants (N 
= 80) were randomly split between a legal or medical decision making scenario and asked to 
judge, on a 7-point rating scale, each strategy in terms of (a) preference, (b) accuracy, (c) fairness, 
(d) ethicalness, and (e) similarity to how legal and medical professionals actually render 
decisions. Results showed that the clinical/fully-rational strategy was rated the highest across all 
attitudinal judgments, whereas the actuarial/heuristic strategy received the lowest ratings across 
all judgments. Considering the two strategy-differentiating factors separately, clinically-based 
strategies were always rated higher than actuarially-based strategies and fully-rational strategies 
were always rated higher than heuristic-based strategies. The potential implications of the results 
for professional decision makers and those affected by their decisions are discussed. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Within the judgment and decision making (JDM) literature, there are two 
important debates regarding whether professional decision makers should: (1) use 
subjective and human based (i.e., clinical) or objective and formula based (i.e., actuarial) 
strategies and (2) combine all available information in a statistically optimal fashion (i.e., 
fully-rational) or use shortcuts that ignore some of the available information (i.e., 
heuristics). Many empirical studies have demonstrated the superiority of actuarial 
methods over clinical methods in producing accurate decisions (see Grove & Meehl, 1996), 
and, despite recent developments, fully-rational strategies have generally been shown to 
produce more accurate decisions than heuristics (see Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982). Accordingly, this research has resulted in a prescription for professionals to use 
decision making strategies that maximize predictive accuracy. Notwithstanding the need 
for professionals to make highly accurate decisions, relatively little research has 
considered the layperson's perceptions of the decision processes. Consequently, the 
current research examines people's attitudes toward various decision strategies. 
The introduction is divided into three sections. First, the history of the clinical 
versus actuarial debate is reviewed. Second, a summary of the various aspects of the 
fully-rational versus heuristic debate is provided. Third, previous research that has 
assessed people's attitudes toward decision making strategies is discussed, and the 
purpose of the current research is outlined. 
1.1 Clinical versus Actuarial Decision Strategies 
The debate regarding whether clinical or actuarial (i.e. formulaic) decision 
strategies produce more accurate decisions can be traced back to an exchange between 
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Max Freyd (1925) and Morris Viteles (1925), who argued the relative merits of each 
approach when selecting personnel. Viteles argued that a judgment about whether an 
individual is suited for a position should involve the subjective interpretation of 
information using scientific knowledge of human behaviour, and therefore the judgment 
should be made by a skilled psychologist and not a statistician. He used an example of a 
medical laboratory, where an assistant may gather a variety of objective data about a 
patient (e.g., pulse, blood pressure), but the final diagnosis is made by a trained physician 
using his training and experience. Freyd replied that the role of a psychologist in 
personnel selection is strictly as a scientist. He stated that any factors that a psychologist 
believes useful in forecasting the success of an applicant should be made explicit and 
empirically tested to assess its predictive validity. The influence of subjective 
interpretations, with their associated prejudices, could then be eliminated by 
incorporating the empirically validated factors into an objective rating scale. Freyd raised 
the question "Is there any reason to believe that a psychologist can select men more 
accurately by adding his scientific knowledge of human behavior than a capable and 
experienced employment manager who is also in the possession of the test results and is 
aware oftheir significance?" (p. 352). Eight decades of research has subsequently 
attempted to answer this question. 
The first empirical comparison of clinical versus actuarial methods of decision 
making was conducted by sociologist Robert Burgess. He compared two psychiatrists 
against a simple statistical formula on their ability to predict the parole success of 1000 
offenders (Burgess, 1928). The same information was made available to both the 
psychiatrists and the actuarial method. His results showed that the psychiatrists were 
What the Public 3 
more accurate in predicting parole success than the actuarial method (83% vs. 76%), but 
were inferior in predicting failure (41% vs. 69%). Burgess also noted that the 
psychiatrists had an advantage because the actuarial method made judgments in all cases, 
whereas the psychiatrists had the option of leaving cases undecided. 
Similarly, a few years later Sarbin (1943) compared a group of counsellors 
against a two-variable (college aptitude test score and high school grades) statistical 
formula on their ability to predict first year college grades. In addition to the two 
variables, the counsellors also had access to other information (e.g., interview notes, 
additional aptitude tests, and achievement tests). Even with this supposed advantage, the 
counsellors' performance was comparable to the formula when predicting first year 
college grades for female students and significantly lower when predicting first year 
college grades for male students. 
In 1954, Paul Meehl published a seminal book that contained a review of all the 
available prediction literature. He reviewed 20 studies that had quantitatively compared 
clinical decision making methods against actuarial decision making methods and found 
that actuarial methods either equalled or outperformed the clinical method, regardless of 
the type of actuarial method that was employed. This systematic summary of the field 
stimulated a wealth of research that compared the performance of clinical and actuarial 
decision strategies (e.g., Goldberg, 1965; Hiler & Nesvig, 1965). 
Twelve years after Meehl's book was published, Sawyer (1966) reviewed a total 
of 45 published studies that compared the relative accuracy of the two methods in 
predicting outcomes such as parole success, improvement during therapy, freshman 
grades, and length ofhospitalization. Of the 75 comparisons between the two methods, 
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Sawyer found that the predictive accuracy of the actuarial method was comparable to the 
clinical method in 4 7 of them and superior to the clinical method in the remaining 28 
comparisons. Because there were a variety of methodological issues with the reviewed 
research (e.g., uncontrolled differences between studies in level of clinical expertise, 
amount of cross-validation of actuarial methods, type of actuarial methods employed), 
Sawyer hesitated to make any firm conclusions regarding the superiority of the actuarial 
method in making predictions. 
In a recent meta-analysis of all studies that had compared the predictive accuracy 
of clinical methods against actuarial methods, Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, and Nelson 
(2000) further confirmed the superiority of actuarial methods. Of the 136 studies included 
in the meta-analysis, 63 (47%) notably favoured actuarial prediction, 65 (48%) showed 
equal performance, and 8 (6%) favoured clinical prediction. The authors did not find any 
systematic difference between the 8 studies that favoured the clinical approach and the 
remaining 128 studies. Although not significant, there was a trend toward a greater 
advantage for the actuarial method in medical and forensic settings. There was no effect 
of moderating variables (e.g., amount of training, level of experience, amount of 
information) on the results. According to Morera and Dawes (2006) "this [Meehl's] book 
started a ''horserace'' comparing pure clinical judgment with pure actuarial judgment 
(based on the same input) in predicting important human outcomes. That particular race 
is over and actuarial judgment has won" (p. 410). 
1.1.1 Why are actuarial methods more accurate? 
The overwhelming superiority of actuarial methods over clinical judgments has 
led to the question of why actuarial methods are consistently more accurate than clinical 
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methods. The primary answer to this question appears to be due to the clinical methods' 
low level of reliability (e.g., DeDombal, Leaper, Staniland, McCann, & Horrocks, 1972; 
Goldberg, 1968; Goldberg & Werts, 1966; Werner, Rose, & Yesavage, 1983). Clinicians1 
appear to recognize the important cues, but do not use them in a consistent manner across 
judgments. This lack of reliability leads to a decrease in the accuracy of their judgments. 
At least two reasons have been provided to explain why clinicians display low 
levels of reliability. One reason relates to the different ways that the clinical and actuarial 
methods understand, accept, and deal with error (Einhorn, 1986). According to Einhorn, 
those who espouse the clinical viewpoint believe that prediction error is due to a current 
lack of complete knowledge, and that perfect predictability is seen as a difficult, but 
achievable, goal. Thus, individuals who use a clinical method do not believe that 
predictive situations contain error that cannot be accounted for, and attempt to combine 
information in a specific and unique way for each case to achieve perfect predictability. 
On the other hand, Einhorn argues that advocates ofthe actuarial method do not believe 
that perfect predictability is a realistic goal and readily accept error as inherent in the 
predictive situation. Individuals who rely on actuarial methods consistently use the most 
valid cues across all cases, and they accept the fact that a certain number of predictions 
will be incorrect. This difference in dealing with error leads to the lowered level of 
consistency, and therefore reliability, of those employing the clinical method. 
A second reason for low reliability relates to the inherent limitations and biases 
present in the human condition. Goldberg (1970) pointed out that humans are subject to 
boredom, fatigue, illness, and situational and interpersonal distractions. All of these 
1 For the purpose of the current document, the term "clinician" is used in a broad sense to refer to human 
decision makers in a variety of fields (legal, medical, etc.). 
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factors serve to lower the reliability of their judgments. A more systematic limitation of 
the human condition is the inability of the human mind to process a large amount of 
information in an optimal fashion (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The inability to 
consider and process all available information in an optimal way has been blamed for 
lowering the reliability and accuracy of clinical judgments (see Kahneman et al., 1982). 
1.1.2 Why are clinical judgments still used? 
As early as 1956, Paul Meehl suggested that "the clinical interpreter is a costly 
middleman who might better be eliminated" (p. 271). Indeed, the demonstrated 
superiority of actuarial methods over clinical methods in prediction produces an 
important question: Why are clinical methods of prediction still heavily relied upon in 
fields ranging from medicine to psychology to law? Although no empirical studies have 
been performed to answer this question, at least six reasons have been suggested: 
(i) Poor education and ignorance. One reason that has been suggested is that 
many clinicians are simply unaware of the findings in this area, or are unaware that a 
debate even exists (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Meehl, 1986). Furthermore, according 
to Dawes et al. (1989), many of those that do recognize that a controversy exists still 
believe that clinical judgment has not been studied fairly, despite the overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary. 
(ii) Deluded self-confidence. Kleinmuntz (1990) proposed that clinicians avoid 
using statistical formulas because they remain confident in their own expertise and 
predictive abilities. This over-evaluation of cognitive abilities has been labelled cognitive 
conceit (Dawes, 1976). Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen (1986) showed that the 
willingness of clinicians to use an actuarial tool depended on whether they believed they 
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had expertise in the field, and not on the accuracy of the method. Those that believed that 
they had expertise in a given field were less likely to use the actuarial tool. Interestingly, 
they performed worse on prediction tasks than non-experts using the actuarial tool. 
(iii) Uniqueness of the situation. Pritchard (1980) stated that actuarial methods are 
only concerned with predictions in the long run and for the "average" client. Therefore, 
clinicians feel obligated to review the accuracy and reliability of the actuarial decision in 
order to produce a decision about a particular person. He argues that the idiographic 
approach allows the clinician to consider the unique features that may be present in each 
individual situation, and therefore attempt to make the best decision for each case. 
(iv) Costs and availability. According to Meehl (1957), actuarial tools are not 
always used because they may not always be available in the area where the prediction is 
being made. There are a number of steps included in the process of designing an actuarial 
tool, including specifying the appropriate variables, obtaining sufficient data to test the 
variables, and then cross-validating the tool on another large number of cases. 
Furthermore, any actuarial tool would need to be constantly updated as new information 
becomes available, and must be re-tested any time it is applied to a population outside 
that which was used to compose it. As can be seen, composing an actuarial tool can be a 
time-consuming and expensive enterprise (Kleinmuntz, 1990). 
(v) The dehumanizing and unethical nature of the approach. Researchers have 
also suggested that clinicians feel it is dehumanizing or unethical to simply plug numbers 
into a formula or "reduce those being judged to a number" (Dawes, 1980; Dawes et al., 
1989; Meehl, 1986). 
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(vi) Fear of technological unemployment. Finally, it has been suggested that 
clinicians with years of training and experience dislike the idea that a relatively naive 
statistician can outperform them in prediction tasks. As Meehl (1986) stated "if PhD 
psychologists spend half their time giving Rorschachs and talking about them in team 
meetings, they do not like to think that a person with a MA in biometry could do a better 
job at many of the predictive tasks" (p. 374). 
As can be seen, the justifications for the continued reliance on clinical methods all 
focus on the attitudes and beliefs of the clinician, with little consideration of the attitudes 
of the general public. Given that clinicians believe such justifications are sufficient to 
ignore the potential advantage of actuarial methods, it is likely that people in general will 
hold some of the same views as clinicians (e.g., believe actuarial methods are 
dehumanizing), leading to a preference for clinically-based strategies. 
In sum, a consistent body of empirical findings has shown that actuarial methods 
match or outperform clinical methods when making predictions. The poor predictive 
ability of clinicians is related to their lack of reliability, which is due, at least in part, to 
their beliefs about error and limited cognitive abilities. Despite the overwhelming 
evidence for the superiority of the actuarial method, professionals still prefer to rely on 
their interpretation and assessment of the available information to make predictions 
(Grove & Meehl, 1996). A number of reasons for this preference have been suggested, 
and given that practitioners use such seemingly logical justifications, it is anticipated that 
people in general will use similar reasoning to arrive at a preference for clinically-based 
strategies. 
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1.2 Fully-rational versus Heuristic Decision Strategies 
The fully-rational versus heuristic (i.e., fast and frugal) debate can be traced back 
to the work of philosophers such as Condorcet, Poisson, and Laplace, who viewed 
common sense as equivalent to probability theory. For example, according to Laplace 
(1814/1951), "the theory of probability is at bottom nothing more than good sense 
reduced to a calculus which evaluates that which good minds know by a sort of instinct, 
without being able to explain how with precision" (p. 196). Because human decision 
making was viewed as probabilistic in nature, decision processes were described using 
complex mathematical and statistical formulae (see Daston, 1981, for a comprehensive 
review of the origins of the fully-rational debate). 
Following in this tradition, some contemporary decision making theorists 
developed a theoretical model ofhuman decision making labelled homo economicus (i.e., 
economic man; see Edwards, 1954). Economic man is assumed to have complete 
information about all available courses of action and their potential outcomes, and the 
computational ability to calculate which of the available courses of action will allow him 
to reach the highest point on his preference scale (Edwards, 1954; Simon, 1955). This 
assumption means that economic man always chooses the best available alternative, 
otherwise known as seeking maximum utility. A variety of strategies and statistical 
formulas that people may intuitively rely on to achieve maximum utility have been 
proposed (e.g., Bayes' theorem, maximization of subjectively expected utility), all of 
which involve probabilistically combining all of the available information in order to 
arrive at the "best" decision (for a description of various probabilistic models, see 
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Edwards & Fasolo, 2001). The ability and motivation ofhuman decision makers to 
consider all the available information and combine it to achieve maximum utility has 
been called full rationality. Full rationality has been viewed as the ideal approach to 
decision making, with the hallmark of a "good" decision being its adherence to the full 
rationality approach (Edwards & Fasolo, 2001; Miljkovic, 2005). 
In order to empirically test the rationality of human decision makers, researchers 
designed laboratory studies to assess the decision making strategies that people actually 
use. These studies generally involved asking people to make a decision regarding the 
likelihood of an event for which prior probabilities are known, and then comparing the 
participants' answers against a normative standard produced by a complex probabilistic 
formula, such as Bayes' rule (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Phillips & Edwards, 
1966; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Perhaps the most robust finding from this research 
has been that people do not follow the calculus of chance or statistical theories of 
prediction, that is, they are not fully-rational decision makers (see Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Instead, people appeared to often be relying on a limited number of judgmental 
heuristics, or simple mental shortcuts, which ignore much of the information that is 
available to the decision-maker. In recent years, research has discovered that even highly 
trained and experienced professionals, such as judges and doctors, appear to rely on 
heuristics when arriving at decisions (e.g., Dhami, 2003; Dhami & Harries, 2001; Kee et 
al., 2003; Lerner, 2005). 
The reliance of decision makers on simple mental strategies led to a line of 
research that attempted to identify the heuristics people were using, as well as the 
subsequent biases that arise as a result of deviating from a fully-rational approach (see 
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Kahneman et al., 1982). Tversky and Kahneman (1974), for instance, identified three 
main heuristics: representativeness (i.e., judge probability of an object belonging to a 
group by evaluating how closely the object resembles the group), availability (i.e., judge 
probability of an event by the ease with which instances can be brought to mind), and 
anchoring (i.e., make estimates by starting from arbitrary initial value that is adjusted to 
yield the final answer). Because these heuristics ignore important probabilistic principles 
such as attending to base rates and prior probabilities, they were claimed to lead to 
severe, systematic, and predictable errors {Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, in 
a classic scenario used to demonstrate the representativeness heuristic, participants were 
presented with brief personality descriptions, allegedly randomly drawn from a group of 
a 100 professionals- engineers and lawyers (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). For each 
description, participants were asked to judge the probability that the description belonged 
to either an engineer or a lawyer. Participants were told that the descriptions were drawn 
from either a pool of70 engineers and 30 lawyers or a pool of30 engineers and 70 
lawyers. In sharp violation of the Bayes' rule, participants in both conditions produced 
essentially the same probability judgments. This suggested that participants ignored the 
available base rates and prior probabilities, and instead relied exclusively on the degree to 
which each description was representative ofthe stereotype of an engineer or lawyer 
when making their judgments. Similar examinations using the other two heuristics (i.e., 
availability, anchoring) produced similar deviations from normative standards, and this 
held despite participants being repeatedly encouraged to be accurate and given rewards 
for correct answers (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). It was 
generally concluded that human decision makers appear unwilling or unable to behave in 
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a fully-rational manner, and this use of heuristics leads to systematic errors in decision 
outcomes. 
In the 30 years since Tversky and Kahneman began their program of research, 
evidence has continued to accumulate demonstrating the fallibility of heuristics (see 
Myers, 2002 for a list ofthe many documented heuristic-led biases). In order to counter 
people's tendency to rely on heuristics, researchers have designed statistical training 
programs and decision aids to help people make decisions that match the fully-rational 
ideal. For example, Kahneman, Slavic, and Tversky (1982) dedicated an entire section of 
their seminal book on heuristics and biases to corrective procedures, including a five-step 
procedure for decision makers to use to produce properly regressive predictions. Many 
other books in the judgment and decision making area have provided similar procedures 
and suggestions for correcting peoples' cognitions (e.g., Hammond, Keeney, & Raiffa, 
2002; Moody, 1988). Decision aids have also been constructed, and their use strongly 
advocated, in a variety of predictive situations, such as whether to admit patients to 
coronary care units (Green & Mehr, 1997). 
Within the past decade, however, a body of research has begun to challenge the 
conclusion that heuristics lead to poor decisions (e.g., Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC 
Research Group, 1999). According to Gigerenzer and his colleagues, the proper test of 
heuristics is not whether they match normative standards, but whether they can make 
reasonable inferences about the real social and physical world. Because they felt that the 
previous heuristics outlined by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) were too vague and poorly 
defined to be properly tested, Gigerenzer and his colleagues outlined a new set of 
heuristics that could be computationally modeled and empirically tested in real-world 
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environments (see Gigerenzer et al., 1999 for a description ofhow these new heuristics 
were constructed). 
A handful of studies have attempted to assess the predictive accuracy ofthese 
new heuristics in real-world decision tasks. For example, Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, and 
Goldstein (1999) compared two heuristics (i.e., Take The Best and Minimalist) against 
two complex statistical formulas (i.e., multiple regression and Dawes' rule) on 20 tasks 
ranging from predicting high school dropout rates to predicting fish fertility. Take The 
Best selects cues in order of their predictive validity, compares the two options or objects 
under consideration on their values for the each cue in descending order until a cue is 
found on which the options differ, and then chooses the option which has the higher cue 
value (Minimalist is identical to Take The Best except it checks the cues in random 
order). Although the heuristics only used a third ofthe available cues (the complex 
formulas considered all the available information), they were nearly as accurate. In the 
second part of the study, the strategies were compared on their ability to generalize to a 
new set of data (i.e., cross-validation). Results of the cross-validation showed that Take 
The Best actually outperformed multiple regression in overall predictive accuracy by 
three percentage points, despite using less than a third of the cues used by the more 
complex approach. Research using similar heuristics (e.g., recognition heuristic), has 
found that they are accurate in decision tasks such as picking stocks (Borges, Goldstein, 
Ortmann, & Gigerenzer, 1999), predicting city size (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999), and 
predicting National Hockey League greatness (Snook & Cullen, 2006). 
The reason why heuristics are able to outperform more complex strategies has 
been attributed to their ability to avoid overfitting and exploit the structure of the 
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information in the environment (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). Overfitting occurs when a 
decision strategy has too many free parameters and tries to make sense of every piece of 
information it encounters. Because of the noise inherent in many cues, complex strategies 
that assume every detail of information in the training set is of utmost importance often 
perform poorly when predicting using novel data. Heuristics avoid overfitting by only 
focusing on "swamping forces" reflected in the most important cues, cues that are likely 
to remain important in changing environments (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003). The accuracy 
ofthe heuristics also stems from their exploitation ofthe structure of information in the 
environment. For example, the recognition heuristic works because recognition is often 
correlated with the criterion under consideration, such as city size. Because in general we 
hear more about large cities than small cities, using the recognition heuristic to decide 
which of two cities is larger will often yield the correct answer (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). 
Although the research assessing the accuracy of heuristics is accumulating, the 
majority of judgment and decision making literature still favours fully-rational strategies. 
This preference for fully-rational strategies has been attributed to the more-is-better 
ideology, which is a belief that "the more laborious, computationally expensive, and 
nonheuristic the strategy, the better the judgments to which it gives rise" (Gigerenzer & 
Todd, 1999, p. 20). Given that this ideology dominates much JDM research as well as 
evaluative judgments about what is good and bad decision making (Gigerenzer et al., 
1999), it is expected that people will prefer fully-rational strategies to heuristic-based 
ones. 
In sum, the fully-rational ideal has been established as the benchmark for 
assessing the accuracy of decisions. Empirical studies have demonstrated that people do 
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not follow a fully-rational approach, but instead often use heuristics to make decisions. 
Because heuristics deviated from the norms of full rationality, they were believed to be 
prone to systematic biases and errors, and attempts were made to construct decision aids 
to assist people in achieving fully-rational decisions. Despite recent challenges by 
Gigerenzer and his colleagues to the "heuristics are bad" conclusion, the majority of 
evidence supports the argument that fully-rational strategies lead to more accurate 
decisions than heuristics. Given the assumption that the best decisions are made using 
laborious, computationally expensive, and non-heuristic strategies (i.e., the more-is-better 
ideology; Gigerenzer et al., 1999), it is anticipated that people will prefer professionals 
who use fully-rational strategies over those who use heuristics. 
1.3 What Decision Making Strategies do People Prefer? 
A number of studies have assessed the attitudes toward clinical and actuarial 
strategies held by people in professional decision making roles. Poythress (1981), for 
example, examined trial judges' ratings ofthe importance ofvarious types of evidence in 
reaching fair and accurate verdicts. He found that of the eight types of evidence 
considered by the judges, actuarially-based evidence was rated the lowest in importance. 
A survey of judges, prosecutors, and defence attorneys by Redding, Floyd, and Hawk 
(2001) also found that legal professionals consider clinically-based expert evidence to be 
more important than actuarially-based expert evidence. Similarly, research has found that 
jurors are more convinced by clinically-based expert testimony than by actuarially-based 
expert testimony (Krauss & Lee, 2003; Krauss & Sales, 2001), and rate clinically-based 
expert witnesses higher than actuarially-based experts on perceived competence, 
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usefulness, and professionalism (Gelinas & Alain, 1993). Similar findings have been 
reported in other domains (e.g., King, 1999). 
Despite the research on professionals' attitudes toward decision strategies, only 
two studies appear to have assessed the type of strategies that are preferred by people 
who may be affected by the outcome of decisions. The first was conducted by Sjoberg 
(200 1 ), who surveyed people regarding their preferences for analytical versus intuitive 
decision making strategies in various contexts (e.g., a stockbroker has to decide how to 
invest in the stock market, police officer has to decide whether a driver is intoxicated, 
etc.). An intuitive strategy was defined as one "without certain explicit decision rules. 
Instead, the decision maker uses his or her feeling about what is a correct decision", and 
an analytical strategy was defined as being "made in accordance with certain rules, or 
sometimes laws, and they involve integrating information in a certain way, with the help 
of calculations, perhaps, or the listings of advantages and drawbacks, etc." (Sjoberg, 
2001, p. 22). For each of28 decision situations, participants were asked to rate whether 
the decision should be made using an intuitive or analytical approach. Sjoberg concluded 
that people prefer intuitive decision making strategies when making personal decisions in 
non-professional roles (e.g., consumer choices), and proposed that this result may be due 
to the fact that people believe that their own decisions are more likely to lead to desired 
results. It is important to note that the intuitive and analytical decision strategies defined 
by Sjoberg cannot be classified according to the two debates of interest to the current 
research. Both approaches in his study use human judgments and no reference is made to 
the amount of information used, making interpretation ofhis findings as they relate to the 
current research difficult. 
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The second study was conducted by Promberger and Baron (2006), who 
performed two experimental studies which measured peoples' willingness to accept 
medical recommendations that came from either a clinical or actuarial approach. 
Participants were given a set of symptoms and the recommendation from either a 
physician or computer program, and then had to decide whether or not to have a specific 
operation (e.g., coronary bypass). They found that participants were more likely to follow 
a recommendation that came from a physician, and participants trusted the 
recommendation of a computer program less than that of a physician. This preference for 
a clinical approach appeared to be due to reduced feelings of personal responsibility 
when relying on a physician's diagnosis (i.e., felt doctor could be held accountable for 
decision outcome while a computer could not) and lack of trust in the ability of 
computers to make good recommendations. Currently, no study appears to have 
examined people's attitudes toward heuristic and fully-rational decision making 
strategies. 
1.4 The Current Research 
The goal of the current research is to assess peoples' opinions regarding decision 
strategies that professional decision makers could utilize when making a decision about 
them. Based on the two debates discussed above, four broad types of decision strategies 
were constructed: (1) clinical/fully-rational, (2) clinical/heuristic, (3) actuarial/fully-
rational, and (4) actuarial/heuristic. Along with overall preference ratings, people will be 
asked to rate their beliefs regarding the accuracy, fairness, and ethicalness of each 
strategy, as well as how similar they believe each strategy is to those actually used by 
professionals. Based on the judgment and decision literature, it is expected that people 
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will be most positive toward professionals who use a clinical/fully-rational strategy and 
will be the least positive toward those who use an actuarial/heuristic strategy. Because the 
clinical/heuristic and actuarial/fully-rational strategies have the preferred component 
from one of the two dimensions, little difference in attitudes is expected toward these two 
strategies. Findings from this research are important, as they will add to the limited 
research on attitudes toward clinical and actuarial strategies and provide the first 
assessment of peoples' attitudes toward heuristic and fully-rational decision strategies. 
This knowledge will help identify any misperceptions people may have about decision 
strategies, as well as informing decision makers regarding what strategies will likely be 
accepted by the general public. 
2.0 Method 
2.1 Sample 
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Participants (N = 80) were undergraduate students from Memorial University of 
Newfoundland. The sample consisted of25 men (mean age= 18.9, SD = 1.4) and 55 
women (mean age= 18.7, SD = 1.9). The average year of study for participants was 1.4 
(SD= .8). 
2.2 Materials 
An experimental booklet was constructed which contained, in the following order: 
(a) an informed consent form; (b) a title page including contact information; (c) an 
experiment information and instructions page; (d) one oftwo scenarios regarding an 
applied decision making situation; (e) descriptions ofthe strategies that each of four 
professionals employ when making a decisions; (f) instructions for participants to rate 
their preference for each decision strategy using a 7 point scale (1 = do not prefer at all; 7 
= highly prefer); (g) an open-ended question that asked participants to record the decision 
strategy that they most and least preferred and reasons for their decisions; (h) instructions 
for participants to rate each decision strategy, using a 7 point scale, on its perceived 
accuracy, fairness, and ethicalness; (i) instructions for participants to rate each decision 
strategy, using a 7 point scale, on its perceived similarity to how professionals actually 
make decisions; (j) a series of demographic questions; and (k) a debriefing form (see 
Appendix A for copy ofbooklets). 
The experimental booklets presented either a medical or legal decision making 
scenario. The two scenarios presented to participants were: 
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(i) Medical. Imagine you have begun exhibiting symptoms that you believe 
are consistent with cardiovascular (heart) disease. Lipid-lowering drugs help lower 
the level ofbad cholesterol in the bloodstream, and have been shown to be 
extremely successful in reducing heart attacks in true cases of cardiovascular 
disease. However they are also very expensive, have potentially serious side effects, 
and once started must be taken for life. Therefore, an accurate diagnosis of your 
condition and subsequent decision on whether to prescribe a lipid-lowering drug is 
very important. There are four doctors that could potentially review your symptoms 
and make a prescription decision. Each doctor is identical in years of experience 
and knowledge of medical practices. Each doctor, however, has a different strategy 
for making a diagnosis of your symptoms. 
(ii) Legal. Imagine you are accused of a crime and are waiting for a decision 
on whether you will be granted bail (i.e., be released until your trial date). Being 
successfully granted bail means you do not have to spend time in prison while 
awaiting your trial. There are four judges that could potentially hear your case and 
make the decision on whether to grant you bail. Each judge is identical in years of 
experience and knowledge ofthe law. Each judge, however, has a different strategy 
for deciding whether you will be granted bail. 
These two scenarios were chosen because previous research has established that judges and 
doctors use heuristics when making decisions (e.g., Dhami, 2003; Dhami & Harries, 2001) 
and actuarial models have been shown to outperform clinicians in these fields (e.g., Boom 
et al., 1988; Hall, 1988). Furthermore, the use of multiple scenarios allows an assessment 
of whether attitudes remain stable across different situations. 
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The strategies that each of the four professional decision makers employed when 
making a diagnostic decision were then outlined. The four decision strategies were 
constructed so that they each represented one of the four possible ways that the clinical-
actuarial and heuristic-fully-rational dichotomies could be combined: 1) clinical/heuristic 
(decision made by intuitively combining a few pieces of information); 2) clinicaVfully-
rational (decision made by intuitively combining all available information); 3) 
actuarial/heuristic (decision made by formulaically combining a few pieces of 
information); and 4) actuarial/fully-rational (decision made by formulaically combining all 
available information). The order in which the decision strategies were presented in the 
booklets was randomized to eliminate potential order effects. 
2.3 Procedure 
Participants were recruited using the department of psychology participant pool and 
contacted via telephone regarding their willingness to participate. Participants were met in 
the Bounded Rationality and Law laboratory and asked to read and sign an informed 
consent form. Once participants had read the instructions, confirmed they understood them, 
and agreed to take part in the experiment, they were randomly assigned to either the 
medical (n = 40) or legal (n = 40) scenario group and presented with the appropriate 
experimental booklet. They were then asked to complete it in a testing cubicle in the 
laboratory, and informed that a researcher was available at all times to answer any 
questions. Upon completion of the booklet, participants were thanked for their participation 
and given a debriefing form that detailed the purpose ofthe present research. The study 
took approximately 30 minutes to complete and participants were paid $3.50 for their time. 
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2.4 Coding and Inter-rater reliability 
The reasons provided for participants' choice of the most and the least preferred 
strategy were coded through a typical grounded approach to categorising written text, 
which involved an iterative refinement and modification of the content dictionaries until 
they reflected all ofthe reasons provided by the participants (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Krippendorff, 1980). Each variable was dichotomously coded and defined to avoid 
discrepancies in category assignment (see Appendix B for content dictionaries). 
Reliability of the coding was assessed by having a trained research assistant 
independently code 10% of the narratives. The reliability of coding, measured using 
Cohen's Kappa (Cohen, 1960), was 0.63 for the "most preferred" question, 0.76 for the 
"least preferred" question, and .69 overall, thus suggesting an acceptable level of 
agreement between the coders (Fleiss, 1981 ). 
2.5 Confidence Intervals and Effect Size calculations. 
As the current research was primarily concerned with practical rather than 
statistical significance (Kirk, 1996), the use of effect sizes and their associated 95% 
confidence intervals (Cis) was emphasized. Confidence intervals contain all the 
information provided by significant testing, and, instead of making a dichotomous yes/no 
decision, they give a range of differences within which the true difference is likely to lie 
(Kirk, 1996). Although different guidelines for interpreting Cis have been given, 
according to Cumming and Finch (2005) a "CI is a range of plausible values for f.l· 
Values outside the CI are relatively implausible" (p. 174). Cis also provide information 
about the precision of the estimate of f.t; wider Cis indicate greater uncertainty (Cumming 
& Finch, 2001 ). The judgment of the degree of width leading to a conclusion of 
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uncertainty depends on what researchers in the field define as relevant (Smithson, 2003). 
For the purpose of the current research, Cis with a width greater than 10% of the range of 
possible values were defined as imprecise; thereby suggesting that replication of the 
results is required. 
Pearson correlation coefficients (r) were calculated for each comparison between 
decision strategies to assess the magnitude of the effects. Effect sizes were assessed by 
examining the r values and their respective 95% Cis for each comparison. According to 
Cohen (1992), r = .1 is a small effect, r = .3 is a medium effect, and r = .5 is a large 
effect. 
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3.0 Results 
Due to the similarity in results (i.e., Cis overlapped between the two scenarios for 
all attitudinal judgments), the data from the medical and legal decision making scenarios 
were combined for the purpose of the current analysis. The mean preference rating, along 
with associated Cis, for each ofthe four decision strategies are shown in Figure 1. As can 
be seen, the clinical/fully-rational strategy received the highest mean preference rating (M 
= 6.1, SD = 1.1, CI= 5.9 to 6.4). This was followed by clinical/heuristic (M= 4.2, SD = 
1.4, CI= 3.9 to 4.6) and actuarial/fully-rational (M= 3.8, SD = 1.7, CI= 3.5 to 4.2), with 
actuarial/heuristic receiving the lowest preference rating (M = 2.5, SD = 1.3, CI = 2.2 to 
2.8). The only comparison that produced overlapping Cis was between clinical/heuristic 
and actuarial/fully-rational. The Cis for all four strategies were narrower than or equal to 
. 70, thus suggesting an acceptable level of precision. 
In order to measure the magnitude of the difference between preferences for 
strategies, a Pearson's r was calculated for each possible comparison between strategies. 
These values are displayed in Table 1. Reading from the left, the effect size for the 
comparison between clinical/fully-rational and actuarial/heuristic strategies was r = .84, 
indicating a large effect. With the exception of the comparison between clinical/heuristic 
and actuarial/fully-rational strategies, all other comparisons produced medium or large 
effect sizes. 
The result of collapsing the strategies across the clinical/actuarial dichotomy is 
shown in Figure 2. Professionals who used fully-rational strategies received a higher 
mean preference rating (M = 4.99, SD = 1.8, CI = 4.7 to 5.3) than those who used 
heuristic strategies (M = 3.37, SD = 1.6, CI = 3.1 to 3.6). 
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Figure 1. Mean preference rating for each strategy. Note. Vertical lines indicate 95% 
confidence intervals. 
Table 1. 
Effect Sizes for Preference 
Comparison 
Clinical/Fully-Rational vs. Actuarial/Heuristic 
Clinical/Fully-Rational vs. Actuarial/Fully-rational 
Clinical/Fully-Rational vs. Clinical/Heuristic 
Clinical/Heuristic vs. Actuarial/Heuristic 
Clinical/Heuristic vs. Actuarial/Fully-Rational 
Actuarial/Fully-Rational vs. Actuarial/Heuristic 
Fully-Rational vs. Heuristic 
Clinical vs. Actuarial 
Note. r =Pearson correlation coefficient for each comparison. 
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Figure 2. Mean preference rating for fully-rational and heuristic strategies. Note. Vertical 
lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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The Cis do not overlap, and the Cis for both strategies were narrower than . 70, 
suggesting an acceptable level of precision. The effect size for the comparison between 
fully-rational and heuristic strategies in preference rating was r = .43, indicating a 
medium effect (Table 1 ). 
Collapsing across the heuristic-fully-rational dichotomy showed that the 
preference for the clinical strategies (M = 5.19, SD = 1.6, CI = 4.94 to 5.43) was stronger 
than the preference for actuarial strategies (M = 3.17, SD = 1.6, CI = 2.91 to 3.42) (see 
Figure 3). The Cis for this comparison also did not overlap, and both were narrower than 
.70. As can been seen from Table 1, the effect size for the comparison between clinical 
and actuarial strategies in preference ratings was r =.53, indicating a large effect. The 
interacting effect of the clinical/actuarial versus fully-rational/heuristic dichotomies was 
assessed and resulted in r = .07. 
Seventy-nine percent of participants most preferred the clinical/fully-rational 
strategy, followed by actuarial/fully-rational (13%), clinical/heuristic (8%), and 
actuarial/heuristic (1 %) (some participants nominated more than one most and least 
preferred strategy, thus the overall average for the two questions exceed 100% ). 
Participants indicated that the primary reasons for most preferring the clinical/fully-
rational strategy were because it used all the information (78% ), used personal 
knowledge and experience (62%), and treated every person as a unique individual (32%). 
Seventy-three percent of participants stated that they least preferred the actuarial/heuristic 
strategy, followed by clinical/heuristic (19%), actuarial/fully-rational (10%), and 
clinical/fully-rational (1 %). The most frequently cited reasons for least preferring the 
actuarial/heuristic strategy were because it did not use all the available information 
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Figure 3. Mean preference rating for clinical and actuarial strategies. Note. Vertical lines 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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(91 %), relied on a computer or formula (69%), and does not treat every case as unique 
(40%). 
The mean ratings, along with their associated Cis, of the four decision strategies 
in terms of accuracy, fairness, and ethicalness are shown in Figure 4. As was seen for 
preference, across each judgment, participants rated the clinical/fully-rational strategy the 
highest and rated the actuarial/heuristic strategy the lowest. The rank order of the ratings 
for the clinical/heuristic and actuarial/fully-rational strategies varied across the 
judgments. Across the 18 possible comparisons among the four decision strategies, only 
three comparisons had Cis that overlapped: the clinical/heuristic strategy and the 
actuarial/fully-rational strategy on ratings of accuracy, fairness, and ethicalness. With the 
exception of ratings of fairness and ethicalness for the actuarial/fully-rational strategy and 
ratings of ethicalness for the clinical/heuristic strategy, the Cis for all strategies were 
equal to or less than . 70. 
The result of collapsing the decision strategies across the clinical/actuarial 
dichotomy for the judgments of accuracy, fairness, and ethicalness is shown in Figure 5. 
The fully-rational strategies were rated higher than heuristic strategies across all three 
judgments, and none of the comparisons had overlapping Cis. The widths ofthe Cis were 
all narrower than .70. Collapsing across the heuristic-fully-rational dichotomy showed 
that clinical strategies were rated higher than actuarial strategies across all three ratings 
(see Figure 6). None of the comparisons had overlapping Cis, and all Cis were narrower 
than .70. 
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Figure 5. Mean accuracy, fair, and ethical ratings for fully-rational and heuristic 
strategies. Note. Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 6. Mean accuracy, fair, and ethical ratings for clinical and actuarial 
strategies. Note. Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 2 contains the overall effect size of preference, accuracy, fairness, and 
ethicalness for each decision strategy. These judgments were combined in order to 
achieve an overall indication of people's attitudes towards strategies (note that similarity 
was not included as it did not measure attitudes towards strategies, but beliefs about what 
strategies are used). Reading from the left, the comparison between clinical/fully-rational 
and actuarial/heuristic strategies produced a mean effect size of r = . 76 (SD = .06, CI = 
.66 to .85), indicating a large effect. The remaining five comparisons, with the exception 
of the comparison between clinical/heuristic and actuarial/fully-rational strategies, 
produced medium or large effect sizes. However, with the exception of the comparison 
between clinical/fully-rational and actuarial/heuristic strategies, all Cis were wider than 
.20, indicating the need for replication. 
The decision strategies were also collapsed across the dichotomies, which 
produced a mean effect size for all four ratings of r = .42 (SD = .08; CI = .29 to .54) for 
fully-rational versus heuristic and r = .42 (SD = .1 0; CI = .27 to .58) for clinical versus 
actuarial (see Table 2). The interacting effect ofthe clinical/actuarial versus fully-
rational/heuristic dichotomies was assessed and resulted in r = .03, r = .02, and r = .05 for 
ratings of accuracy, fairness, and ethicalness, respectively (mean effect size, including 
preference, was r = .04). 
The mean rating of the similarity that participants perceived between each of the 
four decision making strategies and how professionals actually make decisions is shown 
in Figure 7. Results showed that participants rated the clinical/fully-rational strategy as 
the one professionals most likely use (M = 5.8, SD = 1.2, CI = 5.6 to 6.1), followed by the 
clinical/heuristic strategy (M = 4.9, SD = 1.6, CI = 4.5 to 5.2), actuarial/fully-rational 
Table 2. 
Mean Effect Sizes for Preference, Accuracy, Fair, and Ethical 
Comparison 
Clinical/Fully-Rational vs. Actuarial/Heuristic 
Clinical/Fully-Rational vs. Clinical/Heuristic 
Clinical/Fully-Rational vs. Actuarial/Fully-
Rational 
Clinical/Heuristic vs. Actuarial/Heuristic 
Clinical/Heuristic vs. Actuarial/Fully-Rational 
Actuarial/Fully-Rational vs. Actuarial/Heuristic 
Fully-Rational vs. Heuristic 
Clinical vs. Actuarial 
Meanr 
(SD) 
.76 (.06) 
.52 (.09) 
.50 (.10) 
.42(.10) 
.01 (.17) 
.40 (.08) 
.42 (.08) 
.42 (.10) 
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95% Cfr 
.66 to .85 
.39 to .66 
.34 to .67 
.26 to .57 
-.27 to .28 
.27 to .53 
.29 to .54 
.27 to .58 
Note. Mean r (SD) =mean Pearson correlation coefficient for each comparison with 
standard deviations in parentheses; 95% Clr= confidence intervals about r. 
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Figure 7. Mean similarity rating for each decision making strategy. Note. Vertical lines 
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strategy (M = 3.5, SD = 1.6, CI = 3.1 to 3.8), and the actuarial/heuristic strategy (M = 2.8, 
SD = 1.4, CI = 2.4 to 3.1 ). Of all the six possible comparisons between the four strategies, 
the only one that resulted in overlapping Cis was between actuarial/fully-rational and 
actuarial/heuristic. 
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4.0 Discussion 
The current research examined peoples' attitudes toward four decision strategies, 
which were composed using the four possible combinations of the clinical versus 
actuarial and fully-rational versus heuristic strategies (i.e., clinical/fully-rational, 
clinical/heuristic, actuarial/fully-rational, and actuarial/heuristic). Results demonstrated 
that people have the most positive attitude toward professionals that rely on their intuition 
and experience and consider and weigh all available information when making decisions. 
Conversely, people appear to have the least positive attitudes toward professionals that 
use a computer-based statistical formula and only consider some of the available 
information. When the strategies were collapsed across the two debates, clinically-based 
strategies were rated higher than actuarially-based ones across all judgments, and fully-
rational strategies were rated above heuristic-based ones. People displayed similar 
attitudes toward professionals who intuitively process a few bits of information and those 
who use a mechanical aid that processes all available information; likely because each of 
those strategies contained only one of the preferred components (i.e., clinical or fully-
rational). 
Collapsing across the fully-rational/heuristic dimension showed that people 
preferred clinically-based strategies over actuarially-based ones. The Cis for mean 
preference ratings were small and did not overlap, and a comparison between the two 
types of strategies produced a large effect size. This strong preference for clinically-based 
methods matches the results from Promberger and Baron's (2006) study, which found 
that people preferred recommendations from a physician over those produced by a 
computer program. Along with overall preference ratings, people also believed that 
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professionals use clinically based methods when making real-world decisions. This belief 
is consistent with the research demonstrating that many professional decision makers 
continue to rely on their intuition instead of actuarial tools (e.g., Kleinmuntz, 1990). 
Although people appear to be aware of the status of professional decision making 
practices, they also believe that clinically-based strategies are the most accurate, which is 
inconsistent with the research establishing actuarial tools as generally having higher 
predictive accuracy (e.g., Grove et al., 2000). Given that professionals appear to be 
relatively unaware ofthis research on predictive accuracy (Dawes et al., 1989), it is 
unsurprising that the participants in this study, and arguably the general public at large, 
would be unfamiliar with the literature in the area. Participants also rated clinically-based 
strategies higher on fairness and ethicalness, which matches Meehl's (1986) suggestion 
that clinicians hesitate to use actuarial tools because they feel they are dehumanizing and 
unethical. Peoples' judgments ofthe accuracy, fairness, and ethicalness of clinically-
based judgments suggest that they are relying on the same justifications used by 
professionals to form their attitudes. 
Collapsing across the clinical/actuarial dimension showed that people preferred 
fully-rational strategies over heuristic-based strategies. The Cis for the mean preference 
ratings were small and did not overlap, and a comparison between the two types of 
strategies produced a medium effect size. Results also showed that participants generally 
believed that professional legal and medical decision makers use all available information 
when making a decision. This belief that professionals use fully-rational decision 
strategies is in contrast with research demonstrating that people, including judges and 
doctors, rely on heuristics to make decisions (e.g., Dhami, 2003; Dhami & Ayton, 2001; 
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Dhami & Harries, 2001; Smith & Gilhooly, 2006). Participants also rated fully-rational 
strategies as more accurate than strategies that only used some of the available 
information. Although this belief is consistent with the majority of JDM research 
regarding predictive accuracy (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982), it is in contrast with recent 
findings showing that heuristics can match, and sometimes exceed, the accuracy of fully-
rational methods (see Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Given that the fully-rational versus 
heuristic debate remains unsettled, making conclusions about the validity of peoples' 
assumptions regarding accuracy is premature. Results of preference, similarity, and 
accuracy judgments, combined with the fact that participants rated fully-rational 
strategies as the most ethical and fair, demonstrate that participants are holding to the 
more-is-better ideology when arriving at their attitudes toward fully-rational strategies. 
Given the aforementioned preference for fully-rational and clinically-based 
strategies, it was not surprising that the strategy that combined these two factors was the 
most preferred of the four decision strategies used in the current study. Likewise, the least 
preferred strategy (heuristic/actuarial) combined the two least preferred components of 
each debate. Through responses to the open-ended questions, participants indicated that 
their reasons for the most and least preferred strategies primarily pertain to the amount of 
information used, how the information was processed, and level of analysis (i.e., 
nomothetic or idiographic approach). These reasons are able be interpreted within the 
scope of the same theoretical frameworks used above to explain the preferred option 
within each ofthe two debates (i.e., more-is-better ideology and justifications employed 
by professionals). 
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The current research has several limitations which should be considered when 
interpreting the results. Firstly, the sample consisted of undergraduate psychology 
students, which limits the ability to generalize the results to the general population. fu 
order to gauge the true measure of peoples' preferences, a more representative sample is 
needed. Secondly, the current research only used two scenarios from the medical and 
legal domains. Until scenarios from a variety of domains (e.g., education, law 
enforcement) are tested, the findings from the current research cannot be assumed to be 
stable across all situations. Thirdly, the current research was low in realism because the 
provided scenarios may not be relevant to the majority of participants (i.e., most 
participants had probably never experienced a bail hearing or exhibited symptoms of 
cardiovascular disease). Research using participants for which the scenarios hold 
relevance (e.g., heart attack victims, arrestees) would help increase the external validity 
ofthe experiment. Thus, replication and expansion of the current research is needed 
before firm conclusions can be made. 
fu sum, when a decision is being made about them, people appear to want 
decision makers to consider all possible information and combine the information using 
their personal knowledge and experience. Unfortunately, such an expectation is often 
unattainable (i.e., fully-rational) and would likely lead to less accurate decisions (i.e., 
clinically-based). Conversely, people dislike it when professionals only use some of the 
available information and combine it using an actuarial approach, which is ironic given 
that actuarial/heuristic strategies would appear to be the most attainable and potentially 
accurate strategies. fudeed, researchers have begun developing heuristically-based 
actuarial tools which retain the accuracy of an actuarial approach while recognizing the 
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constraints inherent in real-world decision making environments (e.g., Fischer et al., 
2002; Gardner, Lidz, Mulvey, & Shaw, 1996; Green & Mehr, 1997). However, results 
from the current research suggest that people would be reluctant to accept such an 
approach. 
In conclusion, the findings of the current research reveal a large gap between what 
is known about professional decision making and the expectations of the general public. 
Future research should attempt to assess the plausibility of closing this gap by addressing 
issues such as: Would people change their attitudes iftheywere made aware ofthe 
findings regarding the performance of decision strategies? Would people display different 
attitudes if presented with less consequential scenarios or scenarios directly relevant to 
themselves? And do people believe that the decision process is as important as the 
outcome? Attempts should also be made to educate the public regarding the fact that 
heuristics can be used to make effective decisions and that actuarial tools usually produce 
the most reliable and accurate outcomes for consequential, real-world decisions. 
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6.0 Appendix A 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
The purpose of an informed consent form is to ensure that you, as the participant, understand the purpose of 
the study as well as the nature of your involvement. 
Research title: Attitudes toward decision making strategies 
Research personnel: For questions or concerns about this study please contact Joseph Eastwood 
(Department of Psychology, Memorial University ofNewfoundland, 709-737-3101). The proposal for this 
research has been approved by the Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human Research at Memorial 
University. If you have ethical concerns about the research (such as the way you have been treated or your 
rights as a participant), you may contact the Chairperson of the ICEHR at icehr@mun.ca or by telephone at 
737-8368. 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to measure attitudes regarding prescription-making strategies 
employed by doctors. 
Task requirements: The first stage of this study involves a scenario where you are exhibiting certain 
symptoms and are seeking a decision from four potential doctors, all of whom employ different decision 
making strategies, whether to begin taking lipid-lowering drugs. You then answer a set of questions 
regarding your attitudes toward each of the doctor's diagnosis-making strategy. Finally, you will be asked 
to provide the reasoning behind some of the decisions you have made for some of the questions and fill out 
a brief questionnaire. 
Duration: This study should take no longer than 30 minutes to complete. 
Potential risks: You are under no obligation to continue the study if you experience discomfort or anxiety 
during any part of it, or if you feel uncomfortable to do so. 
Benefits: Your participation in this study will be contributing toward the current body of literature on 
beliefs regarding decision making while simultaneously giving you the opportunity to learn about the 
research process. 
Anonymity and confidentiality: The data collected in this study are coded with a number that is not 
associated with your name and therefore all data are anonymous. The data will be used only by researchers 
associated with this project for the purpose of research publications, conference presentations, or teaching 
material. The data that is obtained from this research will be stored on a computer indefinitely. To ensure 
anonymity, please do not write your name anywhere on the questionnaires. As well, the informed consent 
forms will be kept separate from your questionnaires once returned. 
Right to withdraw: Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. Participation in this experiment 
is NOT a course or university requirement. At any point during the study you have the right to not answer 
any questions or to withdraw with no penalty whatsoever. 
Signatures: I have read the above description and I understand that the data in this study will be used in 
research publications or for teaching purposes. My signature indicates that I agree to participate in this 
study. 
Participant's name:----------- Participant's signature: __________ _ 
Date: _______________ _ 
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Attitudes Toward Doctors' Prescription 
Decision-Making Strategies 
Researchers: 
Joseph Eastwood and Dr. Brent Snook 
Faculty of Science 
Department of Psychology 
Principal Contact: Joseph Eastwood 
eastwooj @gmail.com 
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Information About This Study 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my study. Before you begin I 
would like to provide you with some details of what you will be doing. 
This booklet presents a scenario where you have been exhibiting symptoms 
of cardiovascular (heart) disease, and are seeking a decision from one of 
four potential doctors regarding whether you should be prescribed lipid-
lowering drugs (which lower cholesterol and reduce chance of heart attack). 
All doctors are equal in equal in knowledge of medical practices and years 
of experience. However they all employ different strategies when making 
prescription decisions. 
The specifics of each doctor's prescription-writing strategies are outlined 
on an insert page, which you can remove and consult as you complete the 
questions. 
After reading and considering each doctor's prescription-writing strategy, 
proceed through the booklet and answer the questions provided. You will 
also be asked to explain a couple of your decisions. In addition, it is 
important that once you make a decision you do not go back and change it 
at a later time. 
Lastly, you will be asked to provide some anonymous information about 
yourself. 
If you do not have any questions, please begin. 
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Prescription Scenario 
Imagine you have begun exhibiting symptoms that you believe are 
consistent with cardiovascular (heart) disease. Lipid-lowering drugs help 
lower the level of bad cholesterol in the bloodstream, and have been shown 
to be extremely successful in reducing heart attacks in true cases of 
cardiovascular disease. However they are also very expensive, have 
potentially serious side effects, and once started must be taken for life. 
Therefore, an accurate diagnosis of your condition and subsequent decision 
on whether to prescribe a lipid-lowering drug is very important. There are 
four doctors that could potentially review your symptoms and make a 
prescription decision. Each doctor is identical in years of experience and 
knowledge of medical practices. Each doctor, however, has a different 
strategy for making a diagnosis of your symptoms. 
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[TEAR OUT] 
Doctors' Prescription Decision Making Strategies 
Each doctor is provided with all of the information regarding your age, 
gender, weight, cholesterol level, family history of heart disease, evidence 
of arteriosclerosis, smoking habits, drinking habits, and whether you have 
hypertension or diabetes. The decision to prescribe the lipid-lowering drugs 
will be based on the result of the decision making process outlined below. 
Decision Making Strategies 
Doctor Q: This doctor makes decisions intuitively, that is, uses personal 
and medical experience when making prescription decisions. This doctor 
uses 2-3 pieces of information that are believed to be important in 
predicting whether lipid-lowering drugs should be prescribed when making 
a prescription decision for you. 
Doctor F: This doctor makes decisions intuitively, that is, uses personal 
and medical experience when making prescription decisions. This doctor 
considers all of the information provided, rank-orders the importance of the 
information, and integrates it all into a decision on whether to prescribe you 
the lipid-lowering drug. 
DoctorS: This doctor uses a statistical formula that is based on scientific 
research when making prescription decisions. This formula uses 2-3 pieces 
of information which have been found to be good at predicting of whether 
lipid-lowering drugs should be prescribed. This information is entered into 
a computer program that produces a score for you. The doctor's 
prescription decision is based on this score. 
Doctor G: This doctor uses a statistical formula that is based on scientific 
research when making prescription decisions. This formula uses all of the 
available information. All the information is entered into a computer 
program which rank-orders the importance of the information, and 
integrates it all to produce a score for you. The doctor's prescription 
decision is based on this score. 
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Your Views on Doctors' Prescription Decision Making Strategies 
Rate your PREFERENCE for each doctor's decision making strategy: (please 
circle a number indicating your rating for each doctor) 
Doctor Q 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not prefer Neutral Highly prefer 
at all 
Doctor F 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not prefer Neutral Highly prefer 
at all 
DoctorS 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not prefer Neutral Highly prefer 
at all 
Doctor G 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not prefer Neutral Highly prefer 
at all 
Which decision making strategy do you MOST prefer? Please explain why. 
Which decision making strategy do you LEAST prefer? Please explain why. 
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How ACCURATE do you think each doctor is in their prescription decisions? 
(please circle a number indicating your rating for each doctor) 
Doctor Q 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very inaccurate Neutral Very accurate 
Doctor F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very inaccurate Neutral Very accurate 
DoctorS 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very inaccurate Neutral Very accurate 
Doctor G 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very inaccurate Neutral Very accurate 
How FAIR do you think each doctor's prescription decision making strategy is? 
(please circle a number indicating your rating for each doctor) 
Doctor Q 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unfair Neutral Very fair 
Doctor F 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unfair Neutral Very fair 
DoctorS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unfair Neutral Very fair 
Doctor G 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unfair Neutral Very fair 
How ETHICAL do you think each doctor's prescription decision making strategy 
is? (please circle a number indicating your rating for each doctor) 
Doctor Q 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unethical Neutral Very ethical 
Doctor F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unethical Neutral Very ethical 
DoctorS 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unethical Neutral Very ethical 
Doctor G 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unethical Neutral Very ethical 
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How SIMILAR do you think each doctor's prescription decision making strategy is 
to the strategy ACTUALLY USED by practicing physicians? (please circle a 
number indicating your rating for each doctor) 
Doctor Q 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very dissimilar Neutral Very Similar 
Doctor F 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very dissimilar Neutral Very Similar 
DoctorS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very dissimilar Neutral Very Similar 
Doctor G 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very dissimilar Neutral Very Similar 
Please answer the following questions about yourself. (Note: please do not include 
your name). 
1. Age ___ _ 
2. Gender ___ (Male/Female) 
3. Year of Study ___ _ 
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DEBRIEFING FORM 
We would like to thank you for your participation in this study. This form 
will provide you with some information about our study and why we are 
interested in examining these sorts of issues. This study is following up 
research that suggests that people are more likely to prefer human-based 
methods over computer based ones. People also seem to prefer complex 
and deliberate decision making strategies compared to simple strategies. 
This preference exists although other research has shown that simple 
strategies are as accurate as complex ones in making decisions in a variety 
of contexts. Further, computer and statistical methods have been shown to 
consistently outperform human reasoning in accuracy of decision making. 
Therefore, we expected that this research would show the same preferences 
experienced in prior research. 
The second goal of the study was to explore the reasoning behind the 
decisions that you made in the study. Although some general suggestions 
have been made regarding why the human/complex preference is shown, 
little empirical research has been performed to examine this area. It is 
hoped that the findings generated by this study will greatly increase our 
knowledge of why people prefer various decision making strategies. 
The results from such studies may have important implications. The results 
will improve our knowledge of beliefs regarding various decision making 
strategies, as well as the reasoning behind these beliefs. This knowledge 
will be helpful in future decision making situations; it will also suggest 
future research needs to be conducted in this area. 
If you wish to further follow up on the results of this study you may contact 
the principle investigator: Joseph Eastwood, Department of Psychology, 
Memorial University ofNewfoundland, St. John's, NL, AlB 3X9, Canada. 
Email: eastwooj@gmail.com.:_Phone: (709) 737-3101, Fax: (709) 737-2430. 
Please note that individual results are not available. 
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
The pmpose of an informed consent form is to ensure that you, as the participant, understand the pmpose 
of the study as well as the nature of your involvement. 
Research title: Attitudes toward decision making strategies 
Research personnel: For questions or concerns about this study please contact Joseph Eastwood 
(Department ofPsychology, Memorial University ofNewfoundland, 709-737-3101). The proposal for this 
research has been approved by the Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human Research at Memorial 
University. If you have ethical concerns about the research (such as the way you have been treated or your 
rights as a participant), you may contact the Chairperson of the ICEHR at icehr@mun.ca or by telephone 
at 737-8368. 
Purpose: The pmpose of this study is to measure attitudes regarding decision making strategies employed 
by judges. 
Task requirements: The first stage of this study involves a scenario where you are accused of a crime 
and are applying for bail before four potential judges, all of whom employ different strategies when 
deciding whether to grant bail. You then answer a set of questions regarding your attitudes toward each of 
the judges' decision making strategy. Finally, you will be asked to provide the reasoning behind some of 
the decisions you have made for each of the questions and fill out a brief questionnaire. 
Duration: This study should take no longer than 30 minutes to complete. 
Potential risks: You are under no obligation to continue the study if you experience discomfort or anxiety 
during any part of it, or if you feel uncomfortable to do so. 
Benefits: Your participation in this study will be contributing toward the current body of literature on 
decision making while simultaneously giving you the opportunity to learn about the research process. 
Anonymity and confidentiality: The data collected in this study are coded with a number that is not 
associated with your name and therefore all data are anonymous. The data will be used only by 
researchers associated with this project for the pmpose of research publications, conference presentations, 
or teaching material. The data that is obtained from this research will be stored on a computer indefmitely. 
To ensure anonymity, please do not write your name anywhere on the questionnaires. As well, the 
informed consent forms will be kept separate from your questionnaires once returned. 
Right to withdraw: Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. Participation in this experiment 
is NOT a course or university requirement. At any point during the study you have the right to not answer 
any questions or to withdraw with no penalty whatsoever. 
Signatures: I have read the above description and I understand that the data in this study will be used in 
research publications or for teaching pmposes. My signature indicates that I agree to participate in this 
study. 
Participant's name: ___________ Participant's signature: __________ _ 
Date: _______________ ___ 
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Attitudes Toward Judges' Bail 
Decision Making Strategies 
Researchers: 
Joseph Eastwood and Dr. Brent Snook 
Faculty of Science 
Department of Psychology 
Principal Contact: Joseph Eastwood 
eastwooj@gmail.com 
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Information About This Study 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my study. Before you begin I 
would like to provide you with some details of what you will be doing. 
This booklet presents a scenario in which you are accused of a crime and 
will be applying for bail before one of four potential judges. All judges are 
equal in experience and knowledge of the law. However they all employ 
different strategies when deciding whether to grant you bail. 
The specifics of each judge's decision making strategy are outlined on an 
insert page, which you can remove and consult as you complete the 
questions. 
After reading and considering each judge's decision making strategy, 
proceed through the booklet and answer the questions provided. You will 
also be asked to explain some of your decisions. In addition, it is important 
that once you make a decision you do not go back and change it at a later 
time. 
Lastly, you will be asked to provide some anonymous information about 
yourself. 
If you do not have any questions, please begin. 
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Bail Scenario 
Imagine you are accused of a crime and are waiting for a decision on 
whether you will be granted bail (i.e. be released until your trial date). 
Being successfully granted bail means you do not have to spend time in 
prison while awaiting your trial. There are four judges that could potentially 
hear your case and make the decision on whether to grant you bail. Each 
judge is identical in years of experience and knowledge of the law. Each 
judge, however, has a different strategy for deciding whether you will be 
granted bail. 
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[TEAR OUT] 
Judges' Bail Decision Making Strategies 
Each judge is provided with all of the information regarding your age, 
gender, ethnicity, type of crime you have committed, previous convictions, 
community ties, and employment status. The decision about whether you 
will be granted bail will be based on the result of the decision making 
process outlined below. 
Decision Making Strategies 
Judge Q: This judge makes decisions intuitively, that is, uses personal and 
legal experience when deciding bail cases. This judge uses 2-3 pieces of 
information that are believed to be important in predicting whether granting 
bail will be successful when making your bail decision. 
Judge F: This judge makes decisions intuitively, that is, uses personal and 
legal experience when deciding bail cases. This judge considers all of the 
information provided, rank-orders the importance of the information, and 
integrates it all into a decision on whether to grant you bail. 
Judge S: This judge uses a statistical formula that is based on scientific 
research when deciding bail cases. This formula uses 2-3 pieces of 
information, which have been found to be good at predicting of whether 
granting bail will be successful. This information is entered into a computer 
program that produces a score for you. The judge's bail decision is based 
on this score. 
Judge G: This judge uses a statistical formula that is based on scientific 
research when deciding bail cases. This formula uses all of the available 
information. All the information is entered into a computer program which 
rank-orders the importance of the information, and integrates it all to 
produce a score for you. The judge's bail decision is based on this score. 
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Your Views on Judges' Bail Decision Making Strategies 
Rate your PREFERENCE for each judge's bail decision making strategy: (please 
circle a number indicating your rating for each judge) 
Judge Q 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not prefer Neutral Highly prefer 
at all 
Judge F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not prefer Neutral Highly prefer 
at all 
JudgeS 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not prefer Neutral Highly prefer 
at all 
Judge G 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do not prefer Neutral Highly prefer 
at all 
Which decision making strategy do you MOST prefer? Please explain why. 
Which decision making strategy do you LEAST prefer? Please explain why. 
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How ACCURATE do you think each judge is in their bail decisions? (please circle 
a number indicating your rating for each judge) 
Judge Q 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very inaccurate Neutral Very accurate 
Judge F 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very inaccurate Neutral Very accurate 
JudgeS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very inaccurate Neutral Very accurate 
Judge G 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very inaccurate Neutral Very accurate 
How FAIR do you think each judge's bail decision making strategy is? (please 
circle a number indicating your rating for each judge) 
Judge Q 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unfair Neutral Very fair 
Judge F 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unfair Neutral Very fair 
JudgeS 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unfair Neutral Very fair 
JudgeG 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unfair Neutral Very fair 
How ETHICAL do you think each judge's bail decision making strategy is? (please 
circle a number indicating your rating for each judge) 
Judge Q 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unethical Neutral Very ethical 
Judge F 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unethical Neutral Very ethical 
JudgeS 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unethical Neutral Very ethical 
Judge G 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very unethical Neutral Very ethical 
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How SIMILAR do you think each judge's bail decision making strategy is to the 
strategy ACTUALLY USED by appointed judges? (please circle a number 
indicating your rating for each judge) 
Judge Q 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very dissimilar Neutral Very Similar 
Judge F 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very dissimilar Neutral Very Similar 
JudgeS 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very dissimilar Neutral Very Similar 
Judge G 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very dissimilar Neutral Very Similar 
Please answer the following questions about yourself. (Note: please do not include 
your name). 
4. Age ___ _ 
5. Gender ____ (Male/Female) 
6. Year of Study ___ _ 
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DEBRIEFING FORM 
We would like to thank you for your participation in this study. This form 
will provide you with some information about our study and why we are 
interested in examining these sorts of issues. This study is following up 
research that suggests that people are more likely to prefer human-based 
methods over computer based ones. People also seem to prefer complex 
and deliberate decision making strategies compared to simple strategies. 
This preference exists although other research has shown that simple 
strategies are as accurate as complex ones in making decisions in a variety 
of contexts. Further, computer and statistical methods have been shown to 
consistently outperform human reasoning in accuracy of decision making. 
Therefore, we expected that this research would show the same preferences 
experienced in prior research. 
The second goal of the study was to explore the reasoning behind the 
decisions that you made in the study. Although some general suggestions 
have been made regarding why the human/complex preference is shown, 
little empirical research has been performed to examine this area. It is 
hoped that the findings generated by this study will greatly increase our 
knowledge of why people prefer various decision making strategies. 
The results from such studies may have important implications. The results 
will improve our knowledge of beliefs regarding various decision making 
strategies, as well as the reasoning behind these beliefs. This knowledge 
will be helpful in future decision making situations; It will also suggest 
future research to be conducted in this area. 
If you wish to further follow up on the results of this study you may 
contact the principle investigator: Joseph Eastwood, Department of 
Psychology, Memorial University ofNewfoundland, St. John's, NL, AlB 
3X9, Canada. Email: eastwooj@gmail.com!...Phone: (709) 737-3101, Fax: 
(709) 737-2430. Please note that individual results are not available. 
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7.0 Appendix B 
Coding Guide - Most Preferred 
1. Strategy: Which strategy did they most prefer 
2. All Info: Strategy used all the available information 
3. Human Error/Biases: Strategy is not subject to human errors or biases 
4. Involvement: Strategy has less personal involvement 
5. Personalized: Strategy is personalized for each individual, treats every situation 
as umque 
6. Rank Order: Strategy rank orders the important information 
7. Personal Knowledge/Experience: Strategy uses personal legal or medical 
knowledge 
8. Intuitive Accurate: Doctor or judge more accurate or outperforms other 
strategy 
9. Reliable/Consistent: Strategy is more reliable or consistent 
10. Top Predictors: Strategy picks and/or uses only the top predictors 
11. Trust Actuarial: Don't trust computers or formula 
12. Scientific Research: Strategy is based on scientific research 
13. Importance: Need to use strategy because ofthe importance of the decision 
14. Actuarial Accurate: Computer or formula more accurate 
15. Prefer Intuitive: Prefer intuitive or human-based decisions 
16. Sway: Easier to sway judge or doctor (intuition) 
17. Ethical: Judge or doctor (intuition) more ethical 
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Coding Guide - Least Preferred 
18. Strategy: Which strategy did they least prefer 
19. Not All Info: Strategy did not use all the available information 
20. Experience: Strategy based on personal experience or viewpoint 
21. Not Personalized: Strategy not personalized, does not treat each case as unique, 
doesn't consider outside cues 
22. Intuition: Strategy based on personal judgment or intuition 
23. ReliabilityNalidity: Strategy is not reliable or valid 
24. Computer Reliant: Strategy relies on computer or formula 
25. Miss Predictors: Strategy may miss important predictors 
26. Past Cases: Strategy is based on past cases and other people 
27. Competence: Strategy questions doctor or judges competence 
28. All Info Not Needed: Computer doesn't need all information 
29. Human Error: Strategy is subject to human error 
30. Sway: Strategy is harder to sway 
31. Intuition Accurate: Judges or doctors more accurate 
32. Biased: Strategy is biased 
33. Can't Handle Info: Strategy can't handle all the information 
34. Lack of Info: Strategy needs more than 2-3 pieces of information 
35. Feel Better: Strategy makes patient/offender feel better 



